The main goal of my presidential address in January 2020 was to show that philosophy’s past offers a means to empower its present. I hoped to encourage colleagues to make the philosophy we teach and practice more inclusive (both textually and topically) and to adopt a more public-facing engagement with our discipline.

As I add these introductory remarks to my January lecture, it is June 2020 and the need to empower philosophy has never seemed more urgent. We’ve witnessed both the tragic death of George Floyd and the popular uprising of a diverse group of Americans in response to the ongoing violence against Black lives. Many white Americans—and many philosophers—have begun to realize that their inattentiveness to matters of diversity and inclusivity must now be seen as more than mere negligence. Recent demonstrations frequently contain signs that make the point succinctly: “Silence is violence.”

A central claim of my January lecture was that philosophy’s status quo is no longer tenable. Even before the pandemic slashed university budgets and staff, our employers were cutting philosophy programs, enrollments were shrinking, and jobs were increasingly hard to find. Despite energetic attempts on the part of many of our colleagues to promote a more inclusive approach to our research and teaching, the depressing truth remains: philosophy lags behind all other disciplines in the humanities and most in the social sciences in the percentage of women and people of color who are active in the discipline.1 Despite some gains in recent years, philosophy remains, as Linda Alcoff made the point in her 2013 Presidential Address, “demographically challenged.”2

Professional philosophers face two options: we can remain silent and continue to ignore the racism and misogyny that taint our discipline—
and our culture—or we can attempt to change things. There are clear moral and practical reasons for us to act, aggressively.

I am not naïve enough to think that professional philosophers will agree on how to understand the political and ethical demands placed upon us, much less on how to meet those demands. But I do want to suggest that philosophers must no longer ignore either our discipline’s resistance to change or some of the most pressing challenges of our time. For those of us privileged enough to be in the academy (where we have the opportunity to research, write, think, debate, rethink, and teach), we owe it to our students and to the future of our discipline to apply all of our critical tools to the philosophical issues at the core of today’s challenges.

Given the dramatically disproportional rates of COVID deaths among people of color and given the profound effects of Floyd’s public killing, white Americans are finally recognizing, in the words of Jelani Cobb, “a reality” long understood by the “more than forty million people of African descent who live in the United States,” but which has remained “largely invisible in the lives of white Americans.” Cobb writes:

As with men, who, upon seeing the scroll of #MeToo testimonies, asked their wives, daughters, sisters, and coworkers, “Is it really that bad?” the shock of revelation that attended the video of Floyd’s death is itself a kind of inequality, a barometer of the extent to which one group of Americans have moved through life largely free from the burden of such terrible knowledge.³

Whether it is the incapacity of one group of people to glimpse the reality of family members and neighbors or the “shock of revelation” that follows testimonies and public acts of violence, recent events are not just shocking to many philosophers, they pose difficult philosophical questions, which every single one of us has the skills to address. Whether motivated by new insight into social injustices or by concern for the future of the discipline, whether our specialty is metaphysics, philosophy of science, formal epistemology, or another subfield usually considered above the fray of social injustices, if we care about the health and welfare of our discipline and our communities, then we must find ways to address—at least in our courses—the philosophical questions at the core of our current debates. The time is past when we can introduce students to philosophy without discussing topics that touch on issues like systemic injustice, climate change, and fake news and
without introducing philosophical notions like hermeneutical injustice, epistemic violence, and intersectionality.⁴

In order to persuade you that philosophy’s past affords a ready means to empower its present, in what follows I show that the standard history of philosophy warrants a radical revision (sections 1 and 3), reveal the odd historical contingencies of that story’s origins (section 2), proffer examples of how we can use the past to benefit the present (section 3), and display the range of sources available to help us change our courses (if not our research) and thereby empower philosophy (section 4).

SECTION 1: WHAT IS THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY THAT NEEDS TO BE REVISED?

As a historian of early modern philosophy, I am especially keen to interrogate and undermine the myth of the development of that part of philosophy’s history. But the lessons extracted from that interrogation can be applied more generally: the arc of the history of philosophy that has been taught in US universities for decades was constructed in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries by a relatively small group of figures and bears little resemblance to the complications and intellectual richness of philosophy’s past.

But in this section, I set my sights on early modern thought. David Fate Norton offered a brilliant parody of the standard story back in 1981:

It came to pass that darkness covered the face of the earth. And the creator saw that the darkness was evil, and he spoke out, saying, “Let there be light” and there was light, and he called the light “Renaissance.” . . . And thus it was that Descartes begat Spinoza, and Spinoza begat Leibniz . . . [and] Locke begat Berkeley, and Berkeley begat Hume. And then it was that there arose the great sage of Königsberg, the great Immanuel, Immanuel Kant, who, though neither empiricist nor rationalist, was like unto both. He it was who combined the eye of the scientist with the mind of the mathematician. And this too the creator saw, and he saw that it was good, and he sent goodly men and scholars true to tell the story wherever men should henceforth gather to speak of sages past.⁵
There are three features of this myth that I will disprove over the course of my lecture: (1) that Descartes broke radically with past philosophy to start something entirely new; (2) that the main topics of early modern philosophy involve scientific concerns, presumably those of a new science proposed by Descartes; and (3) that the history of philosophy is properly studied as a series of great systems, each following the other like a series of beads on a string.

The first claim can be dispensed with pretty quickly. Although Descartes was undoubtedly a brilliant and an influential seventeenth-century thinker, neither his contemporaries nor his immediate successors took him to have broken radically with the past. Mid-seventeenth-century German philosophers, as the young Leibniz exemplifies, commonly lump Descartes together with Hobbes and Gassendi as a proponent of a “new philosophy.” Their contemporaries regularly note Descartes’s debt to past thinkers, especially Augustine. In his Dictionary, Pierre Bayle mentions mathematicians and philosophers who complained about Descartes “pirating” ideas from earlier sources. While it is indubitable that Descartes’s natural philosophy was important and original, many of his contemporaries found the metaphysical proposals on which his physics was based to be second rate. For example, Henry More, an important Cambridge philosopher—who was likely the first proponent of Cartesianism in England—writes: While I “can never highly enough admire” Descartes as a “Mechanical wit,” he is “no Master of Metaphysics.” Leibniz places Descartes’s mechanical physics as one among many philosophical options in a tradition going back to the ancient atomist, Democritus. After comparing Descartes’s views with those of Democritus, Leibniz explains that he rejects the Frenchman’s metaphysical grounding of the mechanical philosophy replacing it with a metaphysics “replete with life and perceptions.” And like many others writing in the 1670s and 1680s, the English philosopher Anne Conway ranked Descartes’s contributions in natural philosophy on par with other mechanists, suggesting that “Cartesianism,” “Hobbesianism,” and “Spinozism” are equally influential in their account of body, and similarly mistaken.

In my own work, I have exposed Descartes’s debt to the late medieval meditative genre. I will say a bit more about the meditative tradition later, but the point now is that there was a longstanding medieval tradition, which Descartes and his contemporaries knew well and from which Descartes’s own Meditations draws. Like Descartes, sixteenth-century meditators sought self-understanding and knowledge of metaphysical truths and faced deceitful demons along the way. That is, the danger posed by deceiving demons to a truth-seeking meditator was
a well-used trope. But, as I have shown, Descartes’s most important, unnoticed source was the sixteen-century Spanish nun Teresa of Ávila, who is probably the first philosopher to assign deceiving demons the power to force the meditator to withdraw assent from all her former beliefs. And like Descartes, Teresa rids herself of doubt through a careful exploration of her mind and its capacities. Descartes would have learned about Teresa as a boy in the Jesuit school he attended, and she was all the rage in French intellectual circles at the very time that he was writing his own meditations.

Fast-forward to Kant, who does not include Descartes in his lists of prominent figures in the history of philosophy. To be sure, Kant was interested in Descartes’s proposals along with that of other prominent seventeenth-century thinkers, but the philosophers he considers most important in the lead up to his thought are Leibniz, Locke, and, of course, his dogmatic alarm clock, David Hume.

SECTION 2: THE STRANGE GENEALOGY AND RESILIENCE OF THE STANDARD STORY

In section 1, I dispensed with the first of the standard story’s three features. From the perspective of seventeenth-century thinkers, Descartes did not break radically with past philosophy to start something entirely new. In this section, I’ll challenge the remaining two features of the myth, namely, (2) that the main topics of early modern philosophy involve scientific concerns and (3) that the history of philosophy is properly studied as a series of great systems.

An efficient means of exorcising ourselves of these historical demons is to address an obvious question: What is the genealogy of this myth, and why have philosophers embraced it for so long? As complicated as the factors contributing to its origin surely are, I here expose a few major steps in its development.

As prominent French eighteenth-century thinkers began to promote new philosophical topics and methodologies, they found an ally in Descartes. Jean-Baptiste d’Alembert (1717–1783), for example, was keen to stress the power of reason to discern new truths and discovered in Descartes’s philosophy a commitment to that power. According to d’Alembert, his predecessor single-handedly cast aside the “yoke of scholasticism” to create something brand new, which laid the groundwork for Enlightenment thought. Eighteenth-century French philosophers like d’Alembert were prepared to extract elements from
the Cartesian system, which supported their own proposals, highlighting the parts they liked while ignoring the less appealing bits.

But it was post-Kantian German thinkers who created the full-blown myth according to which Descartes’s work created “new ways of thinking” that propelled the rest of modern philosophy and that conveniently led to themselves as its heroes. At first, the focus was on Descartes’s self-investigation, but it soon turned to his supposed invention of modern science.

In his 1820s lectures on the history of philosophy, Hegel credits Descartes with breaking wholly with the past and setting the stage for the greatness of Germanic philosophy, dramatically claiming: “Germanic, i.e., modern philosophy begins with Descartes.” By 1847, Schopenhauer insists “our excellent Descartes” is “the instigator of subjective investigation and in this the father of modern philosophy.” A prominent German professor (and popular lecturer), Kuno Fischer (1824–1907), who seems to have been the first historian to distinguish between the rationalist and empiricist schools, published a gripping (and multivolume) narrative in the late 1850s about Descartes’s innovations and their impact on subsequent thought. In a revealing passage from his extended discussion of Descartes’s life and innovations, Fischer writes in 1878:

In the whole range of philosophical literature, there is no work in which the struggle for truth is portrayed in a more animated, personal, captivating manner, and, at the same time, more simply and clearly, than in Descartes’ essay on method and his first “Meditation.” That irresistible desire for knowledge, that disgust with book-learning, that distrust of all scholars, that aversion to all instruction and improvement by others, that thirst for the world and life, that longing for a fundamental and complete mental renovation, are in those writings conspicuous characteristics.

And then, channeling the ardent fans of the great German poet, author, and sometimes philosopher, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Fischer transforms Descartes into a Romantic thinker on par with the titular character in Goethe’s Faust:

If we bring before our minds the profound critic and thinker in the “Faust” of Goethe, who struggling after truth, falls into maelstrom of doubts, and resolves to seek it henceforth only in himself and the great book
of the world, flees out of his study into the wide world; if we seek in actual life for a man corresponding to this picture, who has lived all these characteristics, and experienced all these conflicts and changes,—we shall find no one who exemplifies this exalted type so perfectly as Descartes, who lived not far from the period which began to develop the Faust legend.\textsuperscript{10}

Fischer’s portrayal of Descartes as a dramatic hero set the stage for the myth. In the early twentieth century, although stripped of its Faustian trappings, Descartes’s heroism was codified by prominent thinkers like Ernst Cassirer (1874–1945) and Étienne Gilson (1884–1978). In Cassirer’s dramatic telling, Descartes single-handedly created the “spiritual essence” of a new epoch, which would “permeate all fields of knowledge,” to which eighteenth-century philosophers responded, and out of which Kant and other German thinkers would arise as liberating angels.\textsuperscript{20} Gilson endorses Cassirer’s position, writing in 1963: “Descartes was the prophet of modern science,” which “accounts for the rise of the ‘Cartesian school,’ a family of great metaphysicians whose relation to Descartes was less that of disciples to a master than of philosophical geniuses inspired by a common spirit but working independently on the same problems.”\textsuperscript{21}

Based on his interpretation of the seventeenth century as a period of “great metaphysical systems,” responding to Descartes, Cassirer advised historians to “string its various intellectual formulations along the thread of time and study them chronologically.”\textsuperscript{22} That is, in order to understand “the sum total” of the period’s “philosophical content,” it was sufficient to track its systems “lengthwise [Längsschnitt].”\textsuperscript{23} Once the standard story took hold, it was reiterated and supported as historians burrowed into the systems. In the words of Cassirer, historians of early modern philosophy had only “to follow step by step the triumphal march of the modern analytical spirit.”\textsuperscript{24}

And so they did, throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. Consider the popular Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources, edited by Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins, both talented historians of philosophy. Their first edition of 1998 contained only the authors included in our myth, their works carefully excerpted so as to suit the standard story and highlight the very philosophical topics contained in the myth, namely, those that give centrality to the development of modern science. Then, in response to a broadening of philosophical context, their 2009 edition added excerpts from works by Michel de Montaigne, Isaac Newton, and Thomas Reid, which were deemed
relevant to the topics. In 2015, Andrew Janiak and I published an op-ed in the Washington Post in which—among other things—we called out this edition for not including any of the well-recognized and important women authors of the period. In correspondence, Watkins was moved to respond to our criticism and, to their credit, Ariew and Watkins included in the Anthology’s third edition of 2019, in their words: “selections from the corpus of traditionally under-represented philosophers . . . which is of course, long overdue.” Although the edition contains selections from three prominent seventeenth-century women (Elisabeth of Bohemia, Anne Conway, and Margaret Cavendish), the myth prevails. The added excerpts are ones in which the women directly criticize the great men on the standard topics so that it’s impossible to surmise the woman’s positive philosophical proposals and originality. As usual, women are mere accessories to prominent men. But equally problematic is the Anthology’s continued commitment to the very figures, systems, and topics selected by our nineteenth- and twentieth-century myth-makers. That is, despite its additions, Ariew and Watkins’s Anthology maintains the second two features of our myth, namely, (2) that the main topics of early modern philosophy involve scientific concerns and (3) that the history of philosophy is properly studied as a series of great systems.

But for those scholars willing to break out of the standard narrative and examine the positive proposals of thinkers like Elisabeth, Conway, and Cavendish, the period seems much more philosophically interesting and its topics much more wide-ranging. Persistent wars, plagues, and social devastations prompted a wide range of early modern thinkers to write about topics like the importance of peace (e.g., Elisabeth, Leibniz), the role of suffering in life (e.g., Teresa of Ávila, Conway), and what we now call epistemic injustice (e.g., Marie de Gournay, Mary Astell). The period witnessed peasant wars, religious massacres, regicide, public torture, the enslavement of Africans, colonization, and women demanding educational equality. All of these problems (and many more) were taken up by a wide range of understudied authors as well as our canonical figures. We will continue to misrepresent the early modern period and misinform our students unless we become willing to explore a wide range of the period’s proposals, debates, and conversations. For example, had Ariew and Watkins merely included writings on education, their Anthology might have contained brilliant proposals by women and counterproposals by mainstays like Rousseau.

Given our twenty-first century concerns with justice, inequality, social hierarchies, sex, gender, dignity, health, epistemic injustice, war, peace, discrimination, and systemic oppression, and given that the history of
philosophy treats all these topics, the time seems right to uncork the power of philosophy’s past.

Before turning to examples of how philosophy’s past might be used to empower it, I want to address two obvious worries. The first concerns the philosophical fecundity of the canonical texts. Many of you might be willing to acknowledge that the triumphal march from great man to great man is historically incorrect, but still insist on the value of the systems and the worthiness of their study. Those of us engaged in what we call “the new narratives project” agree that the canonical figures are well worth studying. We do not want to throw the baby out with the bathwater. But we do think that the strategy of treating the history of philosophy as a triumphal march from great system to great system has outlived its usefulness: too much of value is lost.

The second worry is relevant to those of you who neither work on nor even teach bits of historical texts. You might wonder what this reevaluation of philosophy’s past has to do with you and your work. For reasons I suggested earlier, the teaching and practicing of philosophy needs revitalizing. Philosophy programs are being cut; the intellectual and cultural authority of our discipline is waning. If you care about the future of philosophy, and even of your subfield, it is time to widen your approach and introduce your students to a more diverse group of authors. Whatever the subject matter of the course you teach (whether causation, virtue ethics, probability, animal rights, or philosophy of mathematics, to cite a few), there is a woman, underrepresented minority, or non-western author who spoke intelligently about the topic. Taking a diverse group of writers seriously or discussing the grave challenges that women and people of color faced in doing philosophy in the past would itself constitute an important intervention. And it has never been easier to use well-selected historical materials to make your courses more inclusive, in ways I’ll explain.

SECTION 3: USING PHILOSOPHY’S PAST TO EMPOWER IT

There are two straightforward means to use philosophy’s past to empower it. The first is to apply questions of contemporary importance to our canonical figures in ways that unearth understudied ideas and topics. The second is to explore in a systematic way philosophically sophisticated texts by women, people of color, Islamicate, Jewish thinkers, and writers in other philosophical cultures who were left out of philosophy’s history, but whose works have contemporary relevance. Both of these strategies for using philosophy’s past to empower our
discipline are fundamentally projects of retrieval. The process of retrieval is straightforward enough: historians of philosophy broaden the scope of their research with an eye to excavating and explicating historical texts and topics that provoke the sorts of conversations we think we want to have. When we use philosophy’s past to empower the discipline, we don’t just study history willy-nilly. Rather, we rummage around for topics and texts that raise questions that speak to us now while taking the historical text seriously. As I suggested in section 2, a narrow set of philosophical concerns generated the myth of modern philosophy; and the myth then sustained interest in that limited range of topics. The project of retrieval is not to reject the standard topics, but to unearth new ones, ones that the myth helped to erase and obscure. The newly unearthed texts and topics can provoke different sorts of conversations, invigorate a wide range of philosophy courses, and even effect a reconsideration of canonical systems.

3.1 RETRIEVAL STRATEGY 1: SOCIAL HIERARCHIES AND PERNICIOUS IGNORANCE

As a historian of philosophy, I’ve long been interested in conceptual genealogies. My book series, Oxford Philosophical Concepts, publishes books that track the (often surprising) developments of concepts like sympathy, health, persons, dignity, and evil. More recently, my concern has turned to the historical sources of social hierarchies, which has been inspired by the work of critical race theorists, feminist philosophers, and social epistemologists. Philosophers working in these areas offer conceptual means to help us better understand the dynamic subtleties of racism and sexism, forms of epistemic injustice, and the struggles of marginalized people to find a modicum of authority. These tools allow historians like me to uncover both hidden gems and disturbing truths in philosophy’s past.

I display in this subsection the kind of dramatic results that occur when we apply contemporary philosophical tools to the history of philosophy. The issues that concern me here involve social hierarchies. Needless to say, these are topics of central interest to our current students—and our world—though they are not ones usually included in our standard anthologies and courses. In section 2, I noted how a few prominent eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century thinkers projected their own philosophical concerns onto early modern thought, ignoring the parts that didn’t suit them, and created the myth that became the history of modern philosophy. I now want to broaden my target.
Perhaps we should not be surprised to learn that other major parts of the long-told story about the history of western philosophy (with Plato as its supposed progenitor) also display what social epistemologists call “epistemic ignorance.” Philosophers like Charles Mills, Shannon Sullivan, Nancy Tuana, Linda Alcoff, and many others have noted that the production of ignorance needs to be understood as a substantive practice itself. In this subsection, I want to suggest that our ignorance of central components of philosophy’s great canonical systems—the beads on the string—is a form of “invested” or “pernicious ignorance,” namely, an ignorance that, in the words of Cynthia Townley, is “sustained to misrepresent reality in ways that not coincidentally sustain patterns of . . . privilege.” Our tenacious commitment to a few great men marching in triumph to thinkers just like them has kept philosophers ignorant, not just of noncanonical systems in philosophy’s past, but also of major parts of canonical ones.

**First Example: Aristotle and Gendered Hierarchies**

In *Resisting Reality*, Sally Haslanger is concerned “to clarify and defend . . . that race and gender are socially constructed.” She examines the social production of dominant and subordinate groups and social hierarchies, which she suggests are crucial for understanding kinds of agency. In Kate Manne’s *Down Girl: The Logic of Misogyny*, Manne interrogates the complicated ways that misogyny works to sustain patriarchy. According to Manne:

- **Patriarchy** is “the system by means of which men control women.”

- **Sexism** is “the branch of patriarchal ideology that justifies and rationalizes a patriarchal social order.”

- **Misogyny** is “the system that polices and enforces” patriarchy’s “governing norms and expectations.”

I’ve recently tried to contribute to our understanding of the production of social hierarchies by offering a genealogy of sexism and misogyny in ancient philosophical and medical texts. In “The Philosophical Roots of Western Misogyny,” I recreate some of the most prominent ancient arguments that were used to motivate what I will here call “male-female hierarchical difference.”

- **Male-female hierarchical difference** is the view that female bodies are inferior to male bodies, from which it
is supposed to follow that women are morally inferior to men and should be treated (and educated) differently.\textsuperscript{35}

When we apply philosophical tools—honed by Haslanger, Manne, and many others—to canonical texts, we begin to see some of our philosophical heroes in radically new ways.

Aristotle famously begins his \textit{Metaphysics} with the pronouncement that “People by nature desire to know.”\textsuperscript{36} Like virtually all other professional philosophers who read Aristotle as a student, I took him to maintain not only that all human beings naturally desire to know, but that we all have (something like) an equal chance to become fully rational creatures and acquire virtue. As a young, first gen woman, I was exhilarated by that simple insight. It came as a shock, therefore, to recently discover that when we place Aristotle’s biological writings within the context of his ethical and epistemological views, we can discern the powerful argument he gives for male-female hierarchical difference—an argument that is perfectly consistent with his metaphysical, physical, ethical, and political thought. Because of the rigor and thoughtfulness of Aristotle’s system and because of its wide-ranging influence, his argument for male-female hierarchical difference laid the foundations for hundreds of years of western sexism and misogyny.

Aristotle’s arguments for male-female hierarchical difference and their huge impact on subsequent thinking are best understood against the background of the following set of assumptions, which I’ll dub the “right agency assumptions” and to which I’ll return in the next subsection:

- Human beings are truth-seeking agents with innate capacities to attain ultimate knowledge (i.e., the knowledge that will allow the agent to \textit{get life right}).

- There are ultimate truths, knowledge of which are necessary (and for some thinkers sufficient) to \textit{get life right}.

- A proper education or correct method of analysis promotes the development of agents’ capacities so they will acquire knowledge of ultimate truths and \textit{get life right}.

So human beings have an innate capacity to get life right, which is the goal of life. \textit{Getting life right} is described in different ways in the swath of the history of philosophy that concerns me here. The most common are the following: to have wisdom, virtue, or a life worth living;
to have a relationship with the divinity; to understand the most profound metaphysical truths and what those truths entail.

Beginning with Aristotle, the most influential arguments for male-female hierarchical difference make significant use of the notions of health and teleology, both of which are thoroughly treated in *Oxford Philosophical Concepts*. In the Introduction to *Health: A History*, Peter Adamson notes that the concept of health “is unusual in seeming to straddle the divide between descriptive, empirical concepts and normative, value-laden concepts.” In the Introduction to *Teleology: A History*, Jeffrey McDonough explains that the simplest version of teleology “is that some things happen, or exist, for the sake of other things.” Hippos lie in mud for the sake of cooling themselves. People go to demonstrations for the sake of justice. As we will see, robust teleology and related notions of health helped philosophers like Aristotle justify and explain the inferiority of women. Although I want to set my sights on Aristotle, first, a bit of Plato as background.

In his dialogue the *Phaedo*, Plato is clear that “we philosophers have set our sights on wisdom,” that the truth-seeking agent is the soul, and that the means to get things right requires that the soul separate itself “as much as possible from the body” so that it can “abide in reason” and dwell “alone by itself.” If a soul cannot “purge” itself of bodily matters, then it will never attain “the true moral ideal.” So the *Phaedo* suggests that getting things right requires that the soul purges itself of the body where it then “abides in reason.”

The *Phaedo*’s account of the soul appears to render it genderless, from which it would seem to follow that the souls in female bodies are identical in power and capacities to those in males. And if the souls of men and women are equally capable of attaining wisdom, then it would seem that all agents are equal in their capacities to get life right. But here’s the rub: except for the priestess Diotima, who in Plato’s *Symposium* is described as “a woman wise about many things,” women do not appear as interlocutors anywhere in Plato’s dialogues, even as the sacrificial victims of the Socratic method. Again, the *Phaedo* is instructive: unwise and overly emotional women frame the text. The reader is introduced to Socrates’s wife, Xanthippe, toward the beginning of the dialogue, as his philosopher friends arrive to meet with him before his execution: “As soon as Xanthippe saw us she broke out into the sort of remark you would expect from a woman, ‘Oh, Socrates, this is the last time that you and your friends will be able to talk together!’” Socrates sees no reason to include Xanthippe in reflections about his impending death, and asks her to leave, whereupon “servants led her away crying hysterically.”
Toward the end of the dialogue, in his preparation to drink the hemlock, Socrates’s “children were brought to see him,” along with “the women of his household.” He soon “came back to join” his friends, some of whom begin to cry. In response to their emotional outbursts, he complains: “Why, that was my main reason for sending away the women, to prevent this sort of disturbance. . . . Calm yourselves and try to be brave.” Whether or not Plato took women to be capable of wisdom, Socrates did not expect bravery of either his wife or her female companions.

How might someone who endorses Plato’s apparent views about a genderless soul account for the fact that so few women in the dialogues engage in philosophical discussions, much less become philosophers? Might there be something about the female body that makes it harder for its soul to “purge” itself of bodily associations and “abide in reason”? A Platonist could consistently believe that all souls are equal in capacities, but that female bodies are harder for the genderless soul to escape.

Plato suggests something like this in the *Timaeus*, his mythic account of how the world might have been created. In that dialogue, the narrator spins a tale according to which the gods first created men and then punished those “who lived lives of cowardice or injustice” by turning them into women in their next lives. That is, the *Timaeus* suggests that women are a degraded state of humanity, a kind of punishment that results from improper behavior.

What about women’s bodies might make them so degraded? Enter Aristotle who argues for a severe form of male-female hierarchical difference. Teleology is the framing notion of Aristotle’s philosophy. All living things are active and, in their agency, seek the good. In his *Nicomachean Ethics*, human good is defined as rational activity in accordance with virtue. So Aristotle’s right agency assumptions seem straightforward enough: human beings have an innate capacity to seek the good; Aristotle’s *Ethics* shows them how to do that. It would appear, then, on the basis of his ethical works that Aristotle might be willing to think of women as capable of acquiring virtue and in that sense of getting life right.

Recent scholarship, however, suggests otherwise. Scholars have long noted that Aristotle’s ethical works are written “for the freeborn, well-raised male citizen,” but in her book, *From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle*, Mariska Leunissen has dared to place Aristotle’s ethical writings next to his biological works. In retrieving Aristotle’s views in the latter, she reveals that in Aristotle’s words “women, barbarians, and
‘natural slaves’ are ill-equipped to attain “full virtue and happiness.” The reason for this is that such people face too many biological obstacles. The obstacles that women face arise from the biological reality that their bodies are malformed, an inferiority that infects all aspects of their lives and that fits neatly within Aristotle’s thoroughgoing teleology. The ancient biologist explains that female bodies regularly shed blood because their temperature is lower, which prevents them from using up their fluids. The relative coldness of women correlates with their lower levels of activity. Because male bodies are warmer than women, they tend to be more active and so more powerful. Aristotle’s biological account of the difference between female and male bodies is consistent with the best medical science of his day (i.e., of Hippocrates and other early medical theorists) and his own observations drawn from a variety of species. And it is neatly consistent with other parts of his philosophical system.

The power and genius of Aristotle’s sexism resides in his neat explanation of the teleological importance of female inferiority: the fluids in a female body are imbalanced precisely so that they can be made balanced in bearing children. That is, the bodies of females are inferior to males for the sake of human flourishing. Female health and the health of every woman’s community depend on her physical inferiority and procreative powers. In Aristotle’s words, “this is what it is to be male and female, this is their difference in power.” We can begin to understand what led western philosophy’s first systematic biologist to proclaim, “the female is, as it were, a mutilated male.”

Nor is that all. Women’s physical deformity renders them morally mutilated as well: “because the female is colder and less spirited than the male a woman is more compassionate than a man . . . at the same time, more jealous, more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. She is . . . less hopeful than man, more void of shame, falser of speech, more deceptive . . . more difficult to rouse to action.”

Let’s return to Aristotle’s right agency assumptions. His teleology insists that every animal possesses a set of capacities, which it seeks to fulfill and by means of which it becomes a good—i.e., flourishing—member of its species. It looks like a woman’s soul might share the same cognitive capacities as a man and so innately seek to get life right. But as a member of a “morally unlucky group,” women’s inferior bodies prevent them from developing their capacities in the way that men can. It follows from their natural inferiority that they must be overseen and regulated. Aristotle announces in his Politics: “As regards the sexes . . . the male is by nature superior and the female inferior, the male the ruler and the
female the subject.”48 In brief, for teleologists like Aristotle and his many followers, the subordination of women was not just natural, but required for the sake of humanity. As the influential second-century philosopher of medicine, Galen of Pergamum, succinctly put it, “Indeed, you ought not to think that our Creator would purposely make half the whole race imperfect and, as it were mutilated, unless there was to be some great advantage in such mutilation.”49

It is difficult to exaggerate the influence that Aristotle’s views about women had on the history of philosophy and science. To be sure, at every stage of western thought, there were women who were resourceful within the restrictions forced upon them and who advocated for change. In almost every era, there were moments when the tide might have turned away from male-female hierarchical difference. But it never did. The proponents for male superiority were always victorious. Aristotle’s philosophy formed the curriculum for all European universities by the fourteenth century and his biological writings were read—and revered—until the end of the nineteenth century.50 As Seymour Haden, a prominent Victorian gynecologist, wrote in 1867, “We, being men, have our patients, who are women, at our mercy.”51 It is no wonder that sexism, misogyny, and patriarchy are still so hard to shake.

Second Example: Kant and Racial Difference

I want to present very briefly another example of a canonical philosopher whose commitment to social hierarchies has been ignored, although this philosophical system lies outside the purview of my own research and I have to rely on the work of others.

Scholarship on Kant offers a striking instance of invested ignorance. Despite twentieth-century philosophers’ near obsession with Kant’s thought, serious study and critique of his views on race only began in the 1990s.52 Charles Mills, Robert Bernasconi, and many others have recently shown that Kant’s essays on race and their arguments for the inferiority of Africans compared to Europeans are integral parts of his philosophy.53 That is, the retrieval of Kant’s views about racial hierarchies casts Kant’s thought in a stark new light. Unless we philosophers want to persist in our pernicious ignorance, it behooves us as scholars and teachers of the great German system-builder to engage with the full spectrum of his commitments and directly ask how such a thoroughgoing and brilliant thinker could justify racial hierarchy. To be sure, one might draw on some ideas in Kant’s philosophy without discussing his views on race, but for those teaching his systematic philosophy, it no longer seems appropriate to ignore a part of his system that has such contemporary
importance. Whether or not (to return to demonstrators’ sign) silence is violence in this case, it is surely a missed opportunity to provoke a conversation that speaks to the concerns of our times.

The main lesson of this subsection is that when we apply contemporary philosophical tools to canonical figures, not only do we help create a more accurate account of philosophy’s past, we allow the past to speak to contemporary interests and give ourselves the opportunity to enliven our research and classrooms.

To be clear, I do not intend for us to dismiss a historical figure’s work on the basis of a sexist, racist, anti-Semitic, or homophobic remark. Finding hateful remarks in historical texts is sadly not that surprising. Rather, my purpose here is to encourage philosophical discussions—both inside and outside our classrooms—about parts of canonical systems and to provoke conversations about why those parts have been ignored and what they tell us about topics like power, objectivity, and the social construction of knowledge.

We will empower our discipline when we debate philosophically subtle arguments for social hierarchies and provoke conversations about how brilliant men might offer elaborate justifications for offensive positions, how dominant people construct arguments to maintain their dominance, and how people of power so often speak, in the words of Kimberlé Crenshaw, with “an authoritative universal voice.”

3.2 RETRIEVAL STRATEGY 2: INCLUSIVE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

The second strategy that I propose for using philosophy’s past to empower its present is straightforward enough: tell a more accurate story about the history of philosophy. Recent scholars have begun the important work of excavating the philosophically rich writings of long-ignored women, people of color, Islamicate, and Jewish thinkers. Many of these have significant contemporary relevance. The example that I offer here is short, unexpected, and (necessarily) schematic.

Early Christianity was replete with women speaking out, teaching, and even preaching. A battle ensued about the appropriateness of women joining men as agents of knowledge and purveyors of truth. Conservative voices turned to Platonist views about the need for the soul to “dwell in itself,” which many combined with Aristotelian misogynist ideas about the inferiority of female bodies, to conclude—as Aristotle
had—that women were morally mutilated and must be subordinate to men. The early Christian interpreter Paul the Apostle helped secure the dominance of the conservative movement (and his own fame) when he insisted, for example, “A woman must quietly receive instruction with entire submissiveness” for “I do not allow a woman to teach or exercise authority over a man, but to remain quiet.”\(^{55}\) As the prominent second century philosopher, Christian theologian, and saint Clement of Alexandria summarized the point, “to act is the mark of the man; to suffer that of the woman.”\(^{56}\)

And suffer they did. We have little evidence of philosophical writings by women between the fourth and the eleventh centuries.\(^{57}\) Maybe they didn’t write; maybe they wrote and their works were suppressed. But beginning in the twelfth century, women began to do philosophy. Many escaped the burden of husbands and families to join monasteries or have themselves confined to rooms attached to churches where they could contemplate God, the self, the means to ultimate knowledge, and write about their insights. A clear sign that women were gaining some epistemic agency is that powerful men began to complain. For example, the Chancellor of the University of Paris, Jean Gerson, wrote in the early fourteenth century: “the female sex is forbidden to teach in public. . . . All women’s teaching, particularly formal teaching by word and by writing, is to be held suspect. . . . The reason is clear:” given the legacy of Eve, women “are easily seduced, and determined seducers, and . . . are not proven to be witnesses to divine grace.”\(^{58}\)

Most of us trained in philosophy have (at least) some peripheral knowledge of great scholastic thinkers like Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Thomas Aquinas, though rarely have we heard a word about the brilliant women who were putting their own ideas to parchment, though outside the prestige of universities. Until very recently, philosophers have ignored the elaborate meditative exercises written by women in which they propose innovative ways to get life right.\(^{59}\)

One of my current projects is to provoke a radical rethinking of the history of philosophy between about 1200 and 1700. Among other things I want to show that the sharp divide drawn between late medieval and early modern philosophy is misguided and that late medieval meditative authors—especially women—foresaw many of the ideas that are taken to be distinctively “modern” (e.g., about the self and what are supposed to be Enlightenment developments about human equality and dignity). To be painfully brief, from Hildegard von Bingen in the twelfth century to Anne Conway in the seventeenth century, women began to debate
(what I have called) the “right agency assumptions,” question male-female hierarchical difference, and add brand new requisites to getting life right, namely, compassion and an attentiveness to the suffering of others. As we have seen, Aristotle claimed that women are more compassionate than men, and Clement of Alexandria maintained that women’s nature is to suffer. Perhaps it is not surprising that, as women increasingly engaged in questions about right agency, they interrogated the role that compassion and suffering play in understanding the truths of God’s world.

Consider, for example, Conway, whose only work (published in 1690) is a radical commitment to the equality of all human beings. Her arguments are too complicated to summarize here, so I’ll just mention a couple of her main conclusions, which expose how extraordinary her views are. According to Conway, all human beings are innately capable of reason and have the capacity for compassion and love for all other creatures. Over a series of lives, all creatures (even nonhuman ones!) develop these capacities fully and so get life right. Regardless of the apparent differences among human beings, “all peoples” of the world will eventually attain human perfection: “it is the nature of every creature to develop and progress toward ever greater perfection to infinity.” There ain’t no hierarchy here.

In this brief section, I’ve offered a small sampling of the vast unexplored riches of philosophy’s past that speak to contemporary concerns about sexism, misogyny, dignity, equality, epistemic injustices, and many others. It would be exceedingly easy for us to retrieve these sorts of ideas and use them to empower our courses and even our research. Before turning to my conclusion, I want to call attention to a closely related and equally significant retrieval project.

Melvin Rogers and I are co-editing a new book series, Oxford New Histories of Philosophy. As Rogers summarizes the motivation behind a major part of the series, “the widespread interest in African American political philosophy and the broader category of Africana philosophy is stimulated by a desire to understand better than we do [now] how black people in the West have grappled with the problems of slavery, colonialism, and empire and the underlying logic of white supremacy alongside the emergence of the otherwise philosophically rich and noble ideals of freedom and equality.” Scholars like Lawrie Balfour, Tommy Curry, Chike Jeffers, Robert Gooding-Williams, Meena Krishnamurthy, Neal Roberts, Tommie Shelby, Shetema Threadcraft, Vanessa Wills, and many others are committed to retrieve understudied parts of
SECTION 4. CONCLUSION

The American Philosophical Association was founded one hundred and twenty years ago, in 1900. Its members have seen challenging times to which they have sometimes responded successfully, and sometimes not. As I prepare my January 2020 address for publication in the summer of 2020, the world seems newly precarious and the need for change in academic philosophy as urgent as ever. Will we members of the APA speak more directly to our students and our times or will we not?

In this paper, I have tried to motivate you, my colleagues, to face the challenges of our time and have offered some aid to those of you inclined to do so. One of my main goals has been to show how easy it would be to change the way we teach philosophy so as to make it more inclusive. I’ve tried to show—however odd it might seem at first glance—that an efficient way to empower current philosophy is to rethink its past and reconceive our relation to it.

The standard approach to the history of philosophy has not only led to an inaccurate account of that history, it has ignored plentiful and provocative ideas directly relevant to the problems we face in our current world. If we can muster the courage to look outside the triumphal-march approach, hone new tools, and grapple with unfamiliar ideas, we will discover exciting new topics, methods, and arguments that will enliven our discipline. Given the extraordinary challenges of our world in 2020, I would think we need all the help we can get.

Finally, I would like to address a question that I hope many of you are asking: How might you start using a wider array of materials in your courses? Although there is a growing movement among historians of philosophy to create new narratives and make new materials available, a lot of that work is still in progress. The following list contains what is available now (or soon coming):

- The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* increasingly offers concise accounts of contemporary philosophical tools honed by experts in critical race theory, feminism, and related areas along with an ever-increasing number of neat summaries of a diverse group of philosophers.62
• The APA website contains valuable resources, including the Diversity and Inclusivity Syllabus Collection.

• Peter Adamson’s podcast, Philosophy without Gaps, has been broadening its scope to include useful summaries of (and interviews with experts about) figures in the recesses of philosophy’s gaps.

• The website for my Center for New Narrative in Philosophy at Columbia will become a clearinghouse for new materials, with links to other sites in collaboration with Lisa Shapiro’s important Extending New Narratives Project’s website.

• Andrew Janiak’s Project Vox is an excellent source for information about early modern women and how to include them in courses, with links to other sites.

• Marcy Lascano and Lisa Shapiro have edited an anthology of early modern philosophy that includes texts by women and a wide array of topics (e.g., debates about education and about gender equality), which will be available in 2021.

• Many of the books in my series, Oxford Philosophical Concepts, reimagine parts of philosophy’s past and contain chapters on ideas drawn from Jewish, Islamicate, medieval women, people of color, and other philosophical traditions.

• Melvin Rogers and I intend our book series, Oxford New Histories of Philosophy, to be the go-to place for help in teaching and researching understudied philosophers and ideas.

The time is right to contribute to the future of our discipline.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I dedicate this work to my dear friend and inspiration, Eileen O’Neill (1953–2017), who set me (and many others) on the path to rethink philosophy’s past. Thanks very much to Gary Ostertag and Lisa Shapiro for insightful comments and to Aminah Hasan-Birdwell and my sons, Harris and Josiah Mercer, for advice about details of the lecture, from which this paper came. Thanks to Emilie Chapman Biggs for bibliography help. Finally, thanks to Tommie Shelby whose introductory remarks before my lecture were so generous (and amusing!) that I wasn’t even that nervous giving it!

NOTES
1. For example, only 27 percent of those who responded to the 2019 APA Strategic Planning Survey identified as female. See https://www.apaonline.
On the low percentage of Black students, see Eric Schwitzgebel, “Philosophy Undergraduate Majors Aren’t Very Black, But Neither Are They as White as You Might Have Thought.” Schwitzgebel writes, e.g., “Black students are substantially underrepresented.”

2. Linda Martín Alcoff, “Presidential Address: Philosophy’s Civil Wars.”


4. It is easy to find recent overviews of these topics. See, e.g., Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr., eds. Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice and articles in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.


7. See, e.g., Johann Christoph Sturm, Philosophia Eclectica h.e. Exercitationes Academicae, 51–53; and Hermann Conring in correspondence with Leibniz in Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II i 84f. For a study of Descartes’s Augustinianism, see Stephen Menn, Descartes and Augustine.

8. See Pierre Bayle, The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle, 158. On the similarity of his views to Aristotle’s, see Sturm, Philosophia Eclectica, 161–65; and Kenelm Digby, Two Treatises, passim.


11. Anne Conway, Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, 9. 2-3. Like many of her contemporaries, Conway is highly critical of Descartes’s metaphysics while acknowledging his contribution in natural philosophy, writing, e.g., “It cannot be denied that Descartes taught many excellent and ingenious things about the Mechanical part of natural operations, and how all natural motions proceed according to mechanical laws and rules” (Conway, Principles, 9. 2 [iii]).


14. Although Kant was familiar with Descartes’s philosophy, he gives much more attention to other early modern thinkers, especially Locke and Leibniz. E.g., in the Preface of the Prolegomena, when discussing “the origin of metaphysics,” Kant ignores Descartes, mentioning only the “Essays of Locke and Leibnitz” before turning to Hume’s “attack upon it.” See Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, Preface, 7. Thanks to Ian Proops for calling my attention to Kant’s frequent omission of Descartes in his accounts of important figures in the history of philosophy.

15. Alembert, Jean Le Rond d’, Discours Préliminaire de l’encyclopédie, 74. The Discours Préliminaire de l’encyclopédie was originally published in 1751. Among other things, d’Alembert surveys the progress of human knowledge, emphasizing Descartes as a mathematician and impartial observer of nature. Thanks to Borhane Blili Hamelin for helping me track down some of this material.


17. Arthur Schopenhauer, Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, chapter 2, §7, 14. Thanks to Victor Cosculluela for calling to my attention this passage.
18. The six volumes of Kuno Fischer’s massive history was first published 1854–1871, though went through multiple editions. Kuno Fischer, Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, 6 volumes.

19. Fischer’s account of Descartes’s life and philosophy was wildly popular. It was translated and published in English in 1890. This translation is from History of Modern Philosophy, Descartes and his School, trans. from the Third and Revised German Edition by J. P. Gordy; ed. Noah Porter (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1890), 167-68.


21. Étienne Gilson and Thomas Langan, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, ix-x. Gilson also explains that Descartes intended “to build on ground cleared of the ruins of medieval thought, a new palace of scientific philosophy in which man could find lasting shelter,” 1.

22. Cassirer, Enlightenment, 6-7.

23. Ibid., ix.

24. Ibid., 9. Scholars are beginning to uncover the story behind the steady removal of prominent women philosophers from the history of philosophy. E.g., Sabrina Ebbersmeyer has recently shown that “women philosophers were widely discussed in Germany prior to 1800,” but in the nineteenth century women were increasingly ignored. See Ebbersmeyer, “From a ‘Memorable Place’ to ‘Drops in the Ocean’: On the Marginalization of Women Philosophers in German Historiography of Philosophy,” 1.


26. Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources (third ed.), x.

27. On sex and gender as they relate to issues of equality, see Desmond Clarke’s anthology, The Equality of the Sexes, which contains works by Marie de Gournay, François Poulain de la Barre, and Anna Maria van Schurman. For a recent paper on epistemic injustice in the early modern period, see Allauren Samantha Forbes, “Mary Astell on Bad Custom and Epistemic Injustice.” For one of the most misogynistic texts ever written, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile, ou De l’éducation, first published in 1762.

28. I do not mean to suggest that we should project our own contemporary concerns onto historical texts; rather, my goal is to motivate us to explore topics that have contemporary interest, but that were also important to historical figures. In my “The Contextualist Revolution in Early Modern Philosophy,” I discuss how we historians need to “get things right,” while also exploring new topics and texts.

29. See Lisa Shapiro, “Revisiting the Early Modern Philosophical Canon,” 365–83, esp. sects. 3–4, for important examples of how updating the canon can be relevant to contemporary philosophical discussions and our pedagogy.

31. Cynthia Townley, A Defense of Ignorance: Its Value for Knowers and Roles in Feminist and Social Epistemologies, x. Also see Charles Mills, “White Ignorance.”


34. See my “The Philosophical Roots of Western Misogyny,” 182–208.

35. There has been much excellent philosophical work on gender construction and fluidity, and the difference between gender and biological sex. Aristotle and other ancient philosophers of medicine conflate gender and sex. In the words of one historian, these writers did not distinguish “between sex difference, understood primarily as a physical category, and gender, understood primarily as a social category.” Rather, they “tended to collapse the two concepts into a single form of difference that they referred to indifferently as ‘sex’ (Latin sexus).” See K. Park, “Medicine and Natural Philosophy: Naturalistic Traditions,” 84. To the point of explicating Aristotle’s ideas, I adopt his terminology and employ his binary of female/woman and male/man.


40. Plato, Symposium, trans. Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff, 201D.

41. Plato, Phaedo, 60a.

42. Plato, Phaedo, 115b–118a.

43. Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zevl, in Plato: Complete Works, 90e. The Timaeus was the Platonic dialogue most widely available in medieval Europe.

44. Mariska Leunissen, From Natural Character to Moral Virtue in Aristotle, xvi. For an alternative account of Aristotle’s views, see Sophia M. Connell, Aristotle on Female Animals. For an important study of the relation between Aristotle on sexual difference and politics, see Marguerite Deslauriers. Aristotle on Sexual Difference: Metaphysics, Biology, Politics.

45. For more details about how this all works and citations to other literature, see my “The Philosophical Roots of Western Misogyny,” 182–208.


48. Aristotle, Politics, 1254b13–14. Aristotle goes on to write that “it is better for . . . inferiors that they should be under the rule of a master” and “that some men are by nature free, and others slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right” (1254b18–38).


50. See my “The Philosophical Roots of Western Misogyny” for more details.

51. Quoted in H. King, Hippocrates’ Woman: Reading the Female Body in Ancient Greece, 1.


55. New Testament, Paul, Timothy 2:12. See also Paul, Corinthians, 14:34: “Women should remain silent in churches. They are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the law says.” At Corinthians 11: 2–9, Paul endorses a version of Aristotle’s gendered teleology: “for I want you to understand that Christ is the head of every man, and the husband is the head of his wife. . . . Indeed, man was not made from woman, but woman from man. Neither was man created for the sake of woman, but woman for the sake of man.”

56. Quoted in B. Holmes, Gender: Antiquity and Its Legacy, 79.

57. In fact, early Christianity is replete with examples of relatively independent ascetic women whose exceptionable virtue was considered masculine in its strength. The subjugation of women in early medieval Christianity is a fascinating though complicated story. For an introduction, see Judith Bennett and Ruth Karras, Oxford Handbook of Women in Gender in Medieval Europe.

58. Quoted in Edmund Colledge and James Walsh, eds., A Book of Showings to the Anchoress Julian of Norwich, 2 vols., 151.

59. For important new work on medieval women and references to previous work, see Christina van Dyke, Philosophical Contemplation: Self-Knowledge, Reason, Will, Persons, and Immortality in Medieval Women Mystics.


64. https://scienceandsociety.columbia.edu/content/research-cluster-center-new-narratives-philosophy.

65. narratives-in-philosophy.columbia.edu


68. For more information, see http://www.oxford-philosophical-concepts.com. For example, a forthcoming volume, Humility: A History, edited by Justin Steinberg, will include a chapter by Chike Jeffers that focuses on Black pride and humility.

69. https://www.oxford-new-histories.com
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